PHILOSOPHY, CA. 950–CA. 1050

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Abstract: The leading conception of "Philosophy" in the period 950–1050 distinguishes it from the discipline as understood either in the Carolingian period or the later eleventh and twelfth centuries. This essay takes issue with current opinion on the subject, which tends to give particular stress to the cultivation of Aristotelian logic, mediated above all by Boethius. The focus of the consensus view is fixed on Benedictine monasteries. However, the imperial court and the cathedral schools which arose in the second half of the tenth century received and developed a conception of philosophy based on Cicero's ethical philosophy that is based on the Roman reduction of ancient Stoicism to an ethic of state service. This philosophy was not speculative. Dialectic played a part, but as a handmaiden of the language arts leading to public oratory. Witnesses to this development include Ruotger, the biographer of Bruno of Cologne; Gerbert of Aurillac; and a host of clerical writers in letters, poems and biographies from the period. The advent of speculative philosophy with Berengar of Tours in the second half of the eleventh century represents a sharp break with this brief hundred-year renewal of ancient Roman ethical philosophy.
Keywords: Philosophy, Roman Stoicism, Bruno of Cologne, Gerbert of Aurillac, dialectic, logic, oratory, imperial court, cathedral schools, ethical philosophy, Cicero, lived philosophy.

My purpose in this study is to urge some rethinking of the history of philosophy in the hundred or so years from the mid-tenth to the mid-eleventh centuries. I confess from the outset that philosophy is not my field, that I approach the subject from the point of view of history of education and of aristocratic social ideals, especially of the German imperial courts. I hope that this point of view might add some new perspective on the conception of philosophy, 950–1050, and that the colleagues whose views are discussed here will welcome this outsider's position as a benevolent suggestion for revision and rethinking. I begin by surveying a range of opinion on the nature and context of philosophy in the period.

Marcia Colish's treatment of the tenth and eleventh centuries in her book *Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition*[1] is a good starting point, since her perspective tends to be broader ("intellectual tradition") than histories of philosophy in the narrower sense. She surveys intellectual life of the period in question starting with an overview which includes the Normans (special mention of William the Conqueror) and Cluny, also the reform activity of Dunstan of Canterbury, and a look at monastic and cathedral schools in France. "Monasteries were the leading centers of religious, artistic and intellectual life. The royal courts rarely provided guidance except through indirect patronage."[2] And by that she means by and large the French court. She credits the Ottonian dynasty with a peripheral role: "To the extent that secular rulers patronized culture, the most visible force was the Ottonian court in imperial Germany."[3] She discusses four figures from the Ottonian courts, Bernward of Hildesheim, Hrotsvitha of Gandersheim, Liutprand of Cremona, and Gerbert of Aurillac. While she credits the imperial obligations of Hrotsvitha's work and its peculiar mix of Christian themes and

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[1] Marcia Colish, *The Medieval Foundations of the Western Intellectual Tradition* (New Haven 1997).

[2] Ibid. 160ff.

[3] Ibid. 162.

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classical learning, she sees both Hrotsvitha and Gerbert as "product[s] of convent life."[4] She surveys the range of Gerbert's interests but regards the polymath Gerbert as anomalous: "perhaps the most striking feature of his career is its accidental quality."[5] His patronage by all three Ottos appears not programmatic for those monarchs but the result of a particular impression Gerbert made on them, which interrupted an embracing indifference, an isolated occasion to which they rose. Finally, Colish credits the language arts with the eventual emergence of speculative thought more than the other surveys I've cited below: "… the single development fueling the emergence of speculative thought in the eleventh century was the study of grammar and logic and the emergence of semantic theories that were to take medieval philosophy in creative post-classical directions and to give philosophers and theologians new tools with which to work."[6]

John Marenbon focuses on Gerbert in his *Early Medieval Philosophy, An Introduction*.[7] Like Colish, Marenbon locates Gerbert's intellectual roots and practice in monasteries: "For the most part these scholars [who carried the intellectual life of the tenth and eleventh centuries] were monks of the great Benedictine houses, such as Fleury on the Loire, and St. Gall. No king made his court the preeminent centre for learning that the palaces of Charlemagne and Charles the Bald had been …"[8] "The thinkers of the tenth century made their greatest contribution to philosophy through the development of logic, especially formal logic, and by the middle of the eleventh century, these developments in dialectical technique were having an important effect on the manner of theological debate and its philosophical implications."[9] On Gerbert: "Like Notker and Abbo, Gerbert was a monk, first at Aurillac and then, as abbot at Bobbio."[10] Marenbon also mentions that Gerbert served as schoolmaster at Reims, but is silent on his service to Hugh Capet and his attachment to the imperial court as adviser to all three Ottos and tutor possibly to Otto II and certainly to Otto III (a connection that led to his elevation to Pope as Sylvester II). For Marenbon and Colish the history of philosophy in the period is monastic first and foremost; it is the history of Aristotelian logic as transmitted by Boethius. He and Colish agree that the importance of the period for philosophy is "the emergence of speculative thought in the eleventh century …" because it generates "the revival of speculative thought that culminates in Anselm of Canterbury." The century experienced a "rising interest in logic and semantics" which prepared the debate over universals.[11] Marenbon notes an "increase in clarity and sophistication and in the range of intellectual reference between Eriugena and Abelard," which he sees "based to no small extent on the unspectacular work of

[4] Ibid. 163.
[5] Ibid. 164.
[6] Ibid. 165.
[7] John Marenbon, *Early Medieval Philosophy (480–1150): An Introduction*, 2nd ed. (New York and London 1988).
[8] Also Marenbon, *Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction* (London and New York 2007) 114: "Intellectual Activity [around the year 1000] was mainly confined to a few great monasteries."
[9] Ibid. 80.
[10] Ibid. 82.
[11] *Medieval Foundations* (n. 1 above) 165.

tenth century scholars," the aforementioned monks of the great Benedictine houses.[12]

The essay on earlier medieval philosophy in the *Routledge History of Philosophy*, vol. 3, co-authored by Rosamond McKitterick and John Marenbon,[13] gives close attention to library catalogues and the available texts, and favors again logic: "In establishing the intellectual context for the study of philosophy in the early MA principal considerations are what texts were known and available." The authors cite *Timaeus*; *The Consolation of Philosophy* and Boethius's logical writings; pseudo-Apuleius's *Perihermenias*; Macrobius's *Commentary On the Dream of Scipio*; Cicero, *Topics*. So this list adds the Platonic tradition to the comments of Colish and Marenbon cited above. The authors' summary: "There were three main fields of philosophical activity in the early medieval period: the study of logic, the reading and reaction to ancient and late antique philosophical texts and the analytical discussion of problems about Christian doctrine."[14] McKitterick/Marenbon include the empire and the cathedral schools associated with imperial influence, but they do not associate them with philosophy in the period, and they veer off the mark in identifying the curriculum there with Carolingian models: "In the episcopal schools of Germany, such as those of Trier, Augsburg, Eichstaett and Utrecht, Würzburg, Regensburg, Cologne and Liège, and many more, the Carolingian school curriculum was taught ..."[15] They also underplay the role of royal/imperial patronage: "In the tenth and eleventh centuries on the Continent the Carolingian, Capetian and Saxon kings ... were rather less active in the promotion of scholarship and patronage of learning [than the Carolingians of the 8th/9th centuries]."[16]

It is noteworthy that the treatments cited above do not discuss at any length texts supposedly representative of the development of logic and of the "increase in clarity and sophistication and in the range of intellectual reference between Eriugena and Abelard."[17] Of the "thinkers of the tenth century" the only ones mentioned in the stud-

[12] *Medieval Philosophy* (n. 8 above) 80.

[13] "Philosophy and its Background in the Early Medieval West," *Medieval Philosophy*, ed. John Marenbon, Routledge History of Philosophy 3 (London and New York 1998) 96–119.

[14] Ibid. 108.

[15] Ibid. 103. On the changes in the curriculum from the Carolingian to the Ottonian period, see my study *The Envy of Angels: Cathedral Schools and Social Ideals in Medieval Europe, 950–1200* (Philadelphia 1994) esp. 21–52.

[16] "Philosophy and its Background" (n. 13 above) 107. McKitterick argues the point closely in "Ottonian Intellectual Culture and the Role of Theophano," *Early Medieval Europe* 2 (1993) 53–74. This essay also appeared in *The Empress Theophano: Byzantium and the West at the Turn of the First Millenium,* ed. Adelbert Davids (Cambridge 2002).

[17] There is little to discuss. The most thorough sifting is Carl Prantl's *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* (Leipzig 1885; repr. Graz 1955) 2.49–72, now out of date, but useful for surveying a range of writings specifically on logic. William and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (1962; Oxford 1984) 199–201, mention Gerbert, Abbo and Notker, but focus, eccentrically, on the *Dialectica* of Garland the Computist, whose work is characterized as "confusion" and "a muddle." Garland seems not to distinguish logic from grammar—a significant collapsing of disciplines. On Garlandus see Eleanor Stump, "Garlandus Compotista and Dialectic in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries," *History and Philosophy of Logic* 1 (1980) 1–18; rev. version in her *Dialectic and its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic* (Ithaca and London 1989), who described the Compotista as "the earliest complete medieval logic text still extant" (68). Max Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur des Mittelalters,* vol. 2, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft 9:2:2 (Munich 1923), treats individual authors in some detail and shares Prantl's perplexity about the primitive state of logic. The lengthy essay on early medieval logic to 1100 by John Marenbon in the *Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 2: Mediaeval and Renaissance Logic*, ed. Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods (Am-

ies cited above as representative of the dominant Aristotelianism are Gerbert, Abbo of Fleury, and Notker Labeo. In the second half of the eleventh century Berengar of Tours, Anselm of Bec, and Roscellinus of Compiègne suddenly emerge as prominent figures worthy of careful consideration, representatives of a strong trend to dialectical studies or at least to speculative philosophy. But histories of philosophy want to regard the century prior to the second half of the eleventh century as a continuing development from Carolingian trends. Much more likely is that Berengar and Roscellinus, and to some degree Anselm, represent something radically new (from the perspective of 950–1050), revolutionary and troubling to "philosophy" as practiced in the previous hundred years.[18] The vehemence of the rejection and condemnation of Berengar suggests that his thought differed radically from what had preceded, not that Berengar grew out of the work of his older contemporaries.

In these introductory comments I have surveyed recent opinion of scholars most seriously engaged in the intellectual life of the period, who have contributed distinguished work in history of philosophy. A survey of handbook treatments and references in general histories of medieval philosophy confirms the picture formed from Colish, Marenbon, and McKitterick.[19] The consensus has it that Aristotelian logic, transmitted and cultivated by Benedictine monks in monasteries like St. Gall, Reichenau, and Fleury, continuing Carolingian traditions and "foreshadowing" or preparing for developments in the later eleventh and twelfth centuries, is the focus of philosophy

sterdam and Boston 2008) 1–65, was not available to me. This book appeared just before my article went to the press.

[18] Suzanne J. Nelis has, I believe, put her finger on the fault line between the old (oratorical/rhetorical, arguing from authority) tradition and the new (dialectics, speculative thought) in contrasting Lanfranc of Bec's learning with that of Anselm: "What Lanfranc Taught, What Anselm Learned," *Haskins Society Journal* 2 (1990) 75–82.

[19] Michael Haren, *Medieval Thought: The Western Intellectual Tradition from Antiquity to the Thirteenth Century* (Houndsville and London 1985) 83: "… the history of thought in the period ca. 1000 to ca. 1150 comprises two main strands. First, there is the Aristotelian contribution, which may be fairly said to be the more distinctive. Nothing is so characteristic of the thought of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries as the way in which Aristotle's logic at once stimulated a desire for intellectual order and was grasped as the means to achieve it. Secondly there is the Platonist contribution. Directly and indirectly it exercised important influences on the intellectual life of the time." Julius Weinberg, *A Short History of Medieval Philosophy* (Princeton 1964) 58: "Although there was very little philosophy worthy of the name written in Europe from Eriugena to Anselm, there are some discussions that foreshadow the developments of the twelfth century." Ruedi Imbach,article: "Philosophy," *Encyclopedia of the Middle Ages*, ed. André Vauchez, Barrie Dobson, and Michael Lapidge (Chicago 2000) 2.1131: "Until the mid-twelfth century the philosophical corpus was composed of texts of Boethius, Martianus Capella, Macrobius and the logica vetus." Dennis Bradley, "Philosophy to the Mid-Twelfth Century," *Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, ed. Joseph Strayer (New York 1987) 9.587: "In the tenth century, intellectual life survived in the Benedictine monasteries… Gerbert [again associated with Benedictine monasticism] taught a full course at Reims of Aristotle (old logic) such as it could be derived from Boethius." J. P. Beckman, "Philosophie: Westen," *Lexikon des Mittelalters* (Munich and Zurich 1993) 6.2088, passes over the 10th/11th centuries as "Vorscholastik" and mentions only Berengar of Tours and the monastic resistance to his rationalism. Mariateresa Fumagalli and Massimo Parodi in their *Storia della filosofia medievale da Boezio a Wyclif*, (1989; rev. Rome/Bari 2002) 104–105: "La vita culturale di questo periodo è certamente più povera di quella del secolo precedente: relegata all'interno di scuole episcopali sempre meno numerose e, soprattutto, nei centri monastici, nei quali tuttavia si delinea, proprio nel secolo X, una prima spinta in direzione di quel processo di rinnovamento destinato a svilupparsi nel secolo successivo ... Un progresso ulteriore nello studio della logica viene compiuto, tra l'ultimo terzo del X e la prima metà dell'XI secolo, quando si diffondono nei centri di studio i trattati originali di Boezio. [It would be exaggerated to say that at the end of the 10th c. the tracts of Boethius were known and absorbed] ... comincia in questo periodo un longo lavoro preparatorio durato un secolo e mezzo."

and intellectual life in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Philosophical activity is either located in monasteries or flows out from them into other places, which are not their home. The Platonic tradition is mentioned but gets no treatment that suggests its centrality or its parity with Aristotelian logic. Stoic influence receives no mention; Cicero is acknowledged, but as the author of the *Topics*, i.e., a work on Aristotelian logic.

The omission of Cicero the philosopher is a blind spot in this eyeing of the hundred years of philosophy, 950–1050. The underplaying of the royal and imperial courts another. The evidence both of a dominant Ciceronian/Stoic conception of philosophy and of royal patronage is abundant. I will start the argument for this claim with a famous passage, a "speech" of Otto the Great to his brother, Bruno of Cologne, explaining why the king needs his brother's particular skills in a time of crisis (953). Bruno's biographer Ruotger ascribed the following words to the king:

> "I see [in you] a royal priesthood sent by the grace of God Almighty to the aid of our empire. For you combine in your person the religion of a priest and the strength of a king … And I have long noted that the mother of all noble arts and the virtue of **true Philosophy** is yours, and it is she who has educated you to modesty and greatness of soul."[20]

The passage is often quoted in the discussion of the "imperial church," for which a "royal priesthood" is necessary. The initiative ascribed to the king in placing in his service a man who combines religion, kingliness and philosophy (at least the benefits of Philosophy) is noteworthy, because it defines a context and a role of philosophy quite different from any described in the histories of philosophy cited above. Philosophy gives virtues appropriate to the active life of service to the empire, and philosophy functions in the force-field in which kingliness joins with priestliness, power with religion. His summoning of his brother, Bruno, to the imperial court, argues that this essentially philosophical conception of sacred kingship is, if not conceived by, at least put into action by the king, and at the very least, that Ruotger represented the king as dispensing favor and high position (nepotism aside) partly on the basis of preparation by Philosophy.

If we are to believe Ruotger, Bruno turned the court into a kind of philosopher's academy, "where through studies, whatever was obscure in the world could be illuminated." The court attracted learned men. In Bruno they found an exemplar of wisdom, piety and justice beyond anything in human memory. Those who came with notions of their own learning left chastened and convinced of their ignorance. God made Bruno his vessel, filled him with wisdom and understanding. Bruno stimulated thought on philosophical questions, common and abstruse, and he restored the seven liberal arts, which had long since fallen into neglect, to a place of prominence.[21] All new and

[20] *Lebensbeschreibungen einiger Bischöfe des 10.–12. Jahrhunderts*, trans. Hatto Kallfelz, Ausgewählte Quellen zur deutschen Geschichte des Mittelalters: Freiherr vom Stein Gedächtnisausgabe 22 (Darmstadt 1973) 206 (*Vita Brunonis*, Chap. 20): "... video per Dei omnipotentis gratiam nostro imperio regale sacerdotium accessisse. In te namque et sacerdotalis religio et regia pollet fortitudo ... Nec abesse tibi iam dudum perpendi ipsam ingenuarum arcium matrem et **vere** virtutum **philosophie**, que te ad hanc modestiam magnitudinemque animi erudivit" (emphasis added).

[21] Folcuin of Lobbes (writing ca. 975/990) notes Bruno's support for Rather of Verona in language of interest to this study: "Ottho … imperitabat, cujus frater Bruno unicum et singulare in Christi ecclesia decus futurum, velut pretiosissimus lapis multiplicibus philosophorum pollebat argumentis. Advocatur Ratherius,

grand things that the historians, orators, poets or philosophers discussed Bruno debated with learned men. The court was the stage for disputes between the most learned of the Latin and Greek doctors on the most subtle and highest questions of philosophy. Bruno also raised the level of Latin eloquence at court. He was so diligent a reader that he carried a portable library with him when the court traveled.[22]

There is good reason to think that the origin of the German cathedral schools of the period, some of which were mentioned in the article cited above by McKitterick and Marenbon, lay in the initiative of Otto I and his collaboration with his brother Bruno.[23] A new curriculum emerged in cathedral schools in the Ottonian period, most likely shaped by Bruno. It leaned heavily on the education of an orator from Roman antiquity. As his students and associates moved into cathedral administration in the empire, the new education filtered into the schools; they flourished and became the major institutions preparing future royal counselors and bishops.[24] The initiative of Otto the Great in recruiting scholars, among them Rather of Verona (also teacher of Bruno of Cologne) and Stephan and Gunzo of Novara for his court and for the schools of the north, is well known and underscores his active role in the culture of the schools.

The passage from Bruno's *Vita* quoting the emperor's summons of his brother is based on a broad conception of philosophy as a tutor of statesmen and teacher of virtue. It has Ciceronian roots. Ruotger has placed a passage from the *Tusculan Disputations*, only slightly varied, in the emperor's mouth: "Philosophy, the mother of all the arts … educated us first for the worship of the gods, then for modesty and greatness of soul."[25] Striking in Ruotger's adaptation is the restriction to two personal virtues of philosophy's shaping influence on a statesman: modesty and greatness of soul, excluding, for instance, mental acumen and speculative thought.[26]

By basing the king's words on a Ciceronian conception of philosophy, Ruotger was swimming in the mainstream of philosophy in the second half of the tenth century, both in its historical sources (Cicero) and in its social and political context (the

et habetur inter palatinos philosophos primus" (*Gesta Abbatum Lobbiensium*, PL 137.536A–B). For this writer the term *palatini philosophi* required no explanation.

[22] *Vita Brunonis*, chaps. 5–8. Henry Mayr-Harting's *Church and Cosmos in Early Ottonian Germany: The View from Cologne* (Oxford 2007), surveys learning at the Ottonian court, though its main focus is the intellectual world of Cologne under Bruno. See esp. 52–63, 131–144.

[23] See Josef Fleckenstein, "Königshof und Bischofsschule unter Otto dem Grossen," *Archiv für Kulturgeschichte* 38 (1956) 38–62; Johannes Staub, "Domschulen am Mittelrhein um und nach 1000," *Bischof Burchard von Worms, 1000–1025*, ed. Wilfried Hartmann (Mainz 2000) 275–309; Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels* (n. 15 above).

[24] See Jaeger, *The Envy of Angels* 36–75.

[25] *Tusculan Disputations*, ed. and trans. J. E. King, Loeb Classical Library 141 (Cambridge, MA 1971) 74 (1, 26, 64): "... Philosophia ... omnium mater artium, quid est aliud nisi ... donum…deorum? Haec nos primum ad illorum cultum, deinde ad ius hominum ... tum ad modestiam magnitudinemque animi erudivit ..." On the importance of the *Tusculan Disputations* in the 10th/11th c., see Jaeger, *Envy of Angels* 84–85, 121–123.

[26] Ludwig Vones's criticism of claims that Bruno instituted an intellectual movement eventually centered in Cologne has merit if "school" is understood as book-learning, classroom teaching and composition of works. His reduction of the Cologne "school" to "introduction to church administration," transmission of "practical administrative methods," ignores the many voices that state clearly, Bruno's major influence on future bishops was the transmission of virtues and liberal learning, a Ciceronian program. Unless that process is understood, it is futile to hunt for the curriculum of church administration. Vones, "Erzbischof Bruno von Köln und seine 'Schule,'" *Köln: Stadt und Bistum in Kirche und Reich des Mittelalters: Festschrift für Odilo Engels,* ed. Hanna Vollrath and Stefan Weinfurter (Cologne 1993) 125–137, esp. 137.

royal/imperial court). Cicero is the major source both for the conception of oratory and oratorical studies and for stoical conceptions of philosophy in the Middle Ages. Of course, that statement should not be taken to suggest the philosophy of ancient Stoicism in the full range of its interests. Cicero's interest was virtually restricted to Stoic ethics,[27] and thus focused and limited, his philosophy was available and well received in the Middle Ages.[28] His preoccupations with wisdom, the wise man, the pursuit of virtue and the highest good were of intense interest, diffused through the ethics of Christian administration via Ambrose's *De officiis ministrorum*, adapting and expanding Cicero's *De officiis* and, in our period, prominently informing the curriculum of cathedral school education. Cicero made the formation of life through discipline the highest activity of philosophy, which "promotes a good and happy life" (*bene beateque vivendum*). Its end is virtue.[29] The *Tusculan Disputations* begins,

> ... the system and method of instruction in all the arts which have a bearing upon the right conduct of life [*ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent*] are contained in the study of wisdom which goes by the name of philosophy ...

In Book 5, Philosophy is the *magistra vitae* and "teacher of manners and of discipline."[30]

Ciceronian ideas and formulations passed to the Middle Ages by the well-known routes.[31] Isidore of Seville defines philosophy as "the knowledge of things human and divine joined to the study of living well" (*cum studio bene vivendi*).[32] Alcuin echoes this:

[27] See Michael Lapidge, "The Stoic Inheritance," *A History of Twelfth-Century Philosophy*, ed. Peter Dronke (Cambridge 1988) 81–112, esp. 88–99.

[28] Ibid. 91: "... it was possible for a twelfth-century philosopher to form an accurate and balanced view of Stoic ethics from reading the writings of Cicero and Seneca."

[29] *De officiis* 2.5–6, trans. Walter Miller, Loeb Classical Library 21 (Cambridge, MA 1975) 172–173. Cf. also *In L. Pisonem* 71: "Philosophia, ut fertur, virtutis continet et officii et bene vivendi disciplinam." On Cicero's idea of philosophy, see Josef Mancal, *Zum Begriff der Philosophie bei M. Tullius Cicero*, Humanistische Bibliothek 1.39 (Munich 1982). Many more references to Cicero on philosophy that would be taken up in the Middle Ages are found in Jean Leclercq, *Études sur le vocabulaire monastique du moyen âge,* Studia Anselmiana Philosophica Theologica 48 (Rome 1961).

[30] Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, trans. J. E. King, Loeb Classical Library 18 (Cambridge, MA 1971) 2 (bk. 1, chap. 1): "... cum omnium artium, quae ad rectam vivendi viam pertinerent, ratio et disciplina studio sapientiae, quae philosophia dicitur, contineretur, hoc mihi Latinis litteris illustrandum putavi ..."; 428, 5. 5: "O vitae philosophia dux, o virtutis indagatrix expultrixque vitiorum! ... tu magistra morum et disciplinae fuisti." Also worth noting in this context is Seneca's virtual identification of philosophy and ethics, to the exclusion of "science"; *Epist. Ad Lucil.* 16.3: "[Philosophy] ... animam format et fabricat, vitam disponit, actiones regit, agenda et omittenda demonstrat ..." Also *Epist.* 89.8*:* "Philosophia studium virtutis est ..."

[31] On the idea of philosophy in the earlier Middle Ages, see Leclercq, *Études* (n. 29 above) 39–79; idem, "Pour l'histoire de l'expression 'philosophie chrétienne,'" *Mélanges de Science Religieuse* 9 (1952) 221–226; idem, *The Love of Learning and the Desire for God: A Study of Monastic Culture*, trans. Catherine Misrahi (1961; New York 2003) 107–108; E. R. Curtius, "Zur Geschichte des Wortes Philosophia im Mittelalter," *Romanische Forschungen* 57 (1943) 290–309, esp. 304ff. Curtius is interested the wide range of meanings of the word, but makes no connection with logic/dialectic, other than as one of the seven liberal arts. Also, Peter von Moos, *Hildebert von Lavardin, 1056–1133: Humanitas an der Schwelle des höfischen Zeitalters*, Pariser Historische Studien 3 (Stuttgart 1965) 103–106, lays out the spread of meanings of philosophy in a few lines and analyses a letter of Hildebert to William of Champeaux clearly indebted to the Roman/Stoic conception of philosophy.

[32] Isidore, *Etymologiae* 2.24.1, ed. W. M. Lindsay (Oxford 1911) (unpaged).

> Philosophy is the investigation of natures, the knowledge of things human and divine ... Philosophy is also proper conduct of life, the study of living well [*honestas vitae, studium bene vivendi*], the meditation of death, contempt of the world.[33]

Hrabanus Maurus repeats Alcuin's definition and swells it to encyclopedic length, without adding logic, other than to include *logici* as one of the three types of philosophers.[34]

That a Ciceronian conception of philosophy, bound to the cultivation of virtue and to service of the state, is not an isolated remnant of ancient learning without contemporary relevance, is apparent from many sources, for instance the letters of Gerbert of Aurillac. Gerbert received a letter from the young Otto III inviting the famous scholar—and advisor to both his father and grandfather—to his court in order to provide the young king with instruction and correction "in scriptis et dictis" and mathematics, to give counsel in state affairs, and to "banish Saxon rusticity."[35] Gerbert responds enthusiastically. He praises his future pupil for his earlier study of mathematics and moral philosophy: "Unless you embraced the gravity of moral philosophy," Gerbert writes, "humility, guardian of all virtues, would not thus be impressed upon your words."[36] Again, the connection of humility with the education of a prince or courtier, and again, philosophy as the discipline of moderation, though limited in this case to *moralis philosophia*. The Ciceronian connection is prominent in Gerbert generally. He articulates the ethical conception of philosophy in a letter asserting a fundamental Ciceronian habitus in his life. It is directed to Abbot Ecbert of Tours:

> I am not one to separate the Good from the Useful, as does Panaetius, but rather with Cicero, I seek to mix the Good with the Useful … And since Philosophy does not distinguish between the rules of speaking and the rules of conduct, I have always joined the study of eloquence to the study of living well … For us who are caught up in the affairs of state, both are necessary.[37]

A strong statement: the link of eloquence with the *studium bene vivendi* is necessary for those who administer the affairs of the state; the needs of the *res publica* and the givens of philosophy require it. Gerbert is a Ciceronian far more than an Aristotelian, both in his letters and, it seems, in his public life. He once called himself "a diligent executor of the precepts of Marcus Tullius, both in leisure and in public life."[38] He

[33] Alcuin, *De dialectica*, chap. 1, PL 101.952A: "Philosophia est naturarum inquisitio, rerum humanarum divinarumque cognitio ... Est quoque philosophia honestas vitae, studium bene vivendi, meditatio mortis, contemptus saeculi." Cf. also *De grammatica* PL 101.849C, 852D. Here Cicero meets Cassiodorus, on whose definition of philosophy, see Curtius, "Geschichte des Wortes Philosophia" (n. 31 above).

[34] *De universo* 15.1, PL 111.413.

[35] *Die Briefsammlung Gerberts von Reims*, ed. Fritz Weigle, MGH Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit 2 (Munich 1988), Epist. 186, 221–223. Again, an indication of the high, or as Otto puts it "supreme," importance of learning for the royal family. He calls the concerns which led to his call to Gerbert "haec summa res" (222, line 2).

[36] Epist. 187, 224: "Nisi moralis philosophie gravitatem amplecteremini, non ita verbis vestris custos omnium virtutum impressa esset humilitas."

[37] Gerbert, epist. 44, ed. Weigle, 73: "Cumque ratio morum dicendique ratio a philosophia non separentur, cum studio bene vivendi semper coniuncxi studium bene dicendi, quamvis solum bene vivere praestantius sit eo, quod est bene dicere, curisque regiminis absoluto, alterum satis sit sine altero. At nobis in re publica occupatis utraque necessaria."

[38] Epist. 158, ed. Weigle, 187: "... in otio et negotio praeceptorum M. Tullii diligens fui executor." A

commends Cicero's *Republic* and the Verrine Orations to his friend Constantine of Fleury.[39] Weigle's index to Gerbert's letters lists forty-two direct citations of Cicero (none of Aristotle, except a proverb that required no direct knowledge of Aristotle).[40] The name Aristotle never occurs in his letters. Of course he is acquainted with Aristotle as the author of writings on logic, and he includes them in a conception of philosophy also shaped by Boethius's *Consolation of Philosophy*, [41] but generally as a form of exercise, not as that which constitutes philosophy.

Gerbert's teaching of dialectic is attested in one of the most remarkable documents on education of the period, the *Historiae* of Richer of St. Remi, Book 3, Chapters 46–54. This extensive passage describes Gerbert's teaching at Reims, stressing dialectics, but also poetry, rhetoric and the quadrivium.[42] It is illuminating both for Gerbert's preoccupation with dialectic and for the position of that discipline within the range of subjects he taught.

Chapter 45 tells of Gerbert's tutelage in *logica* with a master of Reims, Gerannus ("in logica clarissimus"). Taking up teaching duties at Reims, Gerbert's course of studies begins with *dialectica*. Richer clearly takes "logic" as identical with "dialectic" in the opening of Chapter 46. The usage of the schools also applies the term "logic" to mean the language arts in general, and Richer follows also that more general usage in ending his presentation of the course of studies beginning in dialectic and ending in oratory with the comment, "Sed haec de logica."[43] Here are the three chapters on the language arts:[44]

claim strengthened by Gerbert's direct borrowings from Cicero. His letter 105, written in the name of Archbishop Adalbero of Reims, angrily demands the return of borrowed books, and begins, "Quousque abutemini pacientia, fidissimi quondam, ut putabatur, amici?" (For others, see Weigle's index of citations.)

[39] Epist. 86, ed. Weigle, 114. In a letter to Abbot Romulf of Sens, he begs, in the tone of a man tortured by care and guilt, for works of Cicero (he does not give titles): "... fluenta M. Tullii sicienti praebete" (Epist. 167, 195).

[40] An intense interest in dialectics may well be present without any mention of Aristotle, but certainly notice of Boethius. Of the seven citations of Boethius, six relate to *De arithmetica*, two to dialectical writings, though the reference to Dialogues on Porphyry in Epist. 23 (46, lines 4–6) refers only to the division of philosophy into the active and contemplative life. In Letter 123, he asks the recipient for an excerpt of Boethius's commentary on *Peri Hermeneias.* The single mention of Boethius by name refers to an unknown *Astrologia* (Epist. 8, 31).

[41] See his letters nos. 45 (ed. Weigle, 74) and 123 (ed. Weigle, 151) where he claims that "philosophy alone" is the cure for the cares of public life.

[42] Richer von Saint Remi, *Historiae*, ed. Hartmut Hoffmann, MGH Scriptores 38 (Hannover 2000) 191–198. See Pierre Riché, "L'enseignement de Gerbert à Reims dans le context européen," *Gerberto: Scienza, storia et mito: Atti del Gerberti Symposium (Bobbio 25–27 luglio 1983)*, ed. Michele Tosi, Archivum Bobiense: Studia 2 (Bobbio 1985) 51–69; Hélène Gasc, "Gerbert et la pédagogie des arts libéraux à la fin du dixième siècle," *Journal of Medieval History* 12 (1986) 111–121; Jason K. Glenn, "Master and Community in tenth-century Reims," *Teaching and Learning in Northern Europe, 1000–1200,* ed. Sally N. Vaughn and Jay Rubenstein, Studies in the Early Middle Ages 8 (Turnhout 2006) 51–68.

[43] Chap. 48, 195. Cf. Hrabanus Maurus, *De universo* PL 111.414B: "Logica autem dividitur in duas species, hoc est Dialecticam et Rhetoricam." Cf. John of Salisbury, *Metalogicon*, ed. J. B. Hall with K. S. B. Keats-Rohan, CCCM 98 (Turnhout 1991) 28 (bk. 1, chap. 10, lines 8–9: "Est itaque logica ut nominis significatio latissime pateat, loquendi vel disserendi ratio"). On the range of meanings of the term, see Mary M. McLaughlin, "Abelard's Conceptions of the Liberal Arts and Philosophy," *Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge*, Actes du quatrième congrès international de philosophie médiévale (Montreal and Paris 1968) 523–530, esp. 526–527. In this essay I use "logic," unless further qualified, in the narrower sesnse, as interchangeable with "dialectic."

[44] Ed. Hoffmann, 193–194: [Chap. 46] "Dialecticam ergo ordine librorum percurrens, dilucidis sententiarum verbis enodavit. Inprimis enim Porphirii ysagogas id est introductiones secundum Victorini

> [Chap. 46] He clarified dialectic with lucid commentaries, following the course in the order of the books [which follow]. Beginning with Porphyry's *Isagoge*, that is, introductions, in the translation of Victorinus the rhetorician, he proceeded to explain these works according to Boethius. Next he investigated Aristotle's book of categories, that is, predicates. He elucidated with great acumen the book of *Perihermeneias* and its difficulties. Next he inculcated in his readers the topics, that is, the loci of arguments, translated by Cicero from Greek into Latin and explicated by the Consul Boethius in six books of commentaries.
>
> [Chap. 47] In addition he read and explicated, much to the benefit of his students, the four books *De topicis differentiis*, two *De sillogismis cathegoricis*, three *De ypotheticis*, one book of definitions, one also of divisions. After laboring over these, when he wished to advance his students to rhetoric, any effort was suspect to him which did not arrive at the art of oratory without first learning the modes of locution, which are to be gleaned from the poets. For that reason he clung to the poets of whom he deemed it important to have a close knowledge. Therefore he read and taught the poets Virgil, Statius, and Terence, and the satirists Juvenal, Persius and Horace, as well as the historian Lucan. Once these were mastered, he moved on to rhetoric.
>
> [Chap. 48] To those instructed in this art he assigned a sophist, who exercised them in controversies. And thus they would operate within the precepts of the art, while seeming to act without art,[45] which seems to be the most important thing for an orator. But enough said of Logic.

It is clear that Richer and Gerbert considered logic in the narrower sense important. It is the subject that brought Gerbert to Reims, garnered him a leave of absence from the imperial court, and inspired praise from Richer (*dilucidis verbis*; *aptissime monstravit ... utiliter legit*)—no other part of his "trivial" teaching is singled out for praise. The longer passage on dialectic stands out in contrast to the brief mention of rhetoric and the omission of grammar. But it is also clear that dialectic is the first step in an orator's education progressing from that beginning to its final stage in forensic oratory. Richer's presentation places the subjects purposefully in a sequence: first comes the *logica vetus*, then the *modi locutionum*, then the study of the poets, advancing to the "art of oratory" ("post quorum laborem ... ad rhetoricam suos provehere vellet ... modi locutionum ... [without which one cannot advance] ad oratoriam artem. Poetas igitur adhibuit ... Quibus assuefactos ... ad rhetoricam transduxit. Qua instructis, sophistam adhibuit.") Logic in the narrower sense was propaedeutic to rhetoric and poetry, and

rhethoris translationem, inde etiam easdem secundum Manlium explanavit. Cathegoriarum id est predicamentorum librum Aristotelis consequenter enucleans. Periermenias vero id est de interpretatione librum, cuius laboris sit, aptissime monstravit. Inde etiam topica id est argumentorum sedes a Tullio de Greco in Latinum translata, et a Manlio consule sex commentariorum libris dilucidata, suis auditoribus intimavit."

[Chap. 47] "Necnon et quatuor de topicis differentiis libros, de sillogismis cathegoricis duos, de ypotheticis tres, diffinitionumque librum unum, divisionum eque unum, utiliter legit et expressit. Post quorum laborem, cum ad rhethoricam suos provehere vellet, id sibi suspectum erat, quod sine locutionum modis, qui in poetis discendi sunt, ad oratoriam artem ante perveniri non queat. Poetas igitur adhibuit, quibus assuescendos arbitrabatur. Legit itaque ac docuit Maronem et Statium Terentiumque poetas, Iuuenalem quoque ac Persium Horatiumque satiricos, Lucanum etiam historiographum. Quibus assuefactos, locutionemque modis compositor, ad rhethoricam transduxit."

[Chap. 48] "Qua instructis, sophistam adhibuit. Apud quem in controversiis exercerentur, ac sic ex arte agerent, ut preter artem agere viderentur, quod oratoris maximum videtur. Sed hec de logica."

[45] A difficult passage to translate. Richer posits a kind of oratorical *sprezzatura*: the ability to hide skills gained with great effort and exercise them as though with great ease. Here, an adaptation based on Cicero. See Hoffmann's note on 3.48, 195 n. 3.

all three subordinate to the oratorical art.[46]

A letter of Gerbert written in 986 or 987 during his stint as *magister scolarum* at Reims gives some perspective on his teaching there. It is addressed to the monk Bernard of Aurillac. Gerbert responds to the request of Bernard for news of him, and they evidently were not in close touch, since Gerbert fills him in on his departure from Bobbio about three years earlier. The only other news is that he is teaching "the liberal disciplines to most noble scholars" at Reims. He has composed a booklet on the rhetorical art. Gerbert describes this *opus* as "admirable to experts, useful to students for the things of rhetors prone to slip the mind, most difficult to comprehend and to fix in the memory."[47] He offers to send Bernard this booklet and information on music for students. It may be that this passage says nothing about the priority of rhetoric over dialectic, but it is worth noting that Gerbert, asked what he's been doing in the past years answers, in effect, "I've left my abbacy, am teaching the arts and writing about rhetoric." Foregrounding that art says at the very least that he did not anticipate an interest in dialectic at Aurillac.

The discipline of dialectic will maintain its position subordinate to oratory in the course of studies in our period. Walther of Speyer confirms this structure of studies in his *Libellus scolasticus* composed in 984.[48] The *Libellus* introduces his Life of St. Christopher. It purports to describe his own education at the cathedral school of Speyer under Bishop Balderich (970–986). After grammar and the poets an elaborate allegory, in all but impenetrable Latin (Vossen's translation is indispensable), introduces Philosophy (a young/old maiden); she is dressed and made up by the five serving girls of Dialectica, then is passed on to rhetoric for exercise in disputation and legal cases, finally, the happy crowd of students come to rest at the feet of Logic in its meaning of the language arts in general. They now have mastered these arts. All that remains is left to Cicero: "Sub pedibus Logice recubabat nexa coaeve / Commissura tibi reliquorum munia, Tulli."[49]

This sequence and hierarchy of studies—dialectic leads to rhetoric and poetry; study culminates in legal oratory—was maintained at cathedral schools in Germany and France with gradually weakening foundations up to the time when John of Salisbury will lament its overturning in the twelfth-century schools of Paris.

Taken together, Bruno of Cologne and Gerbert of Reims educated a large number of future bishops and abbots. Their influence on politics, church history and intellectual life in the tenth and eleventh century is vast. Their influence on the history of logic, however, is minor. Logic was a subject of subordinate importance in a culture that educated clergy to positions as royal and ecclesiastical administrators. As a handmaiden of an orator's education, it was held in prominence more by the great names of

[46] Richer's own style exemplifies oratorical training informing the style of historical writing. See Robert Latouche, "Un imitateur de Salluste au Xe siècle: Richer," in idem, *Études médiévales* (Paris 1966) 69–81; Hans-Henning Kortüm, *Richer von Saint-Remi: Studien zu einem Geschichtsschreiber des 10. Jahrhunderts* (Stuttgart 1985) 93–112.

[47] Epist. 92, ed. Weigle, p. 121: "... quandam figuram edidi artis rethorice ... opus sane expertibus mirabile, studiosis utile ad res rhetorum fugaces et caligonissimas comprehendendas ..."

[48] Edition, German translation, and analysis in Peter Vossen, *Der Libellus scolasticus des Walther von Speyer: Ein Schulbericht aus dem Jahr 984* (Berlin 1962).

[49] *Liber scolasticus*, lines 146–147.

its past cultivators—Aristotle, Porphyry, Boethius—than by anything approaching mastery of its intricacies.[50] (That luster may account for the extensive list of texts and authors of the old logic cited by Richer.)

Gerbert's brief tract *De rationali et ratione uti* (*On the Rational and the Use of Reason*) provides the best evidence for Gerbert's practice of dialectic and the role of Aristotle. It also underscores the role of the king as the muse and instigator of Gerbert's work on logic. In a preface in the form of a letter to the emperor (Otto III), the author explains the work's origin. He recalls a time when, at a gathering of scholars in the presence of the emperor, he raised some of the most difficult problems proposed by Aristotle and others:

> While we dwelt in Germany in the hot time of the year, bound to imperial service as we always are and always will be, the impulse of my mind, silently shedding moderation, resolved divine mysteries, I know not how, into words and brought forward some problems described by Aristotle and the greatest of men in the most obscure utterances, so that it would be remarkable, amidst the exigencies of the wars against the Sarmatians then in preparation, if any mortal might possess such inner chambers of mind, from which things so subtle and so luminous could flow forth like streams from the purest fount.[51]

In addition to the emperor, many noble schoolmen and men of high learning were present, a fair number of whom were bishops, men distinguished for their wisdom and famous for their eloquence. But while the profound issues flood to Gerbert almost unexpectedly and certainly without preparation and rehearsal (so his formulation suggests—a good example of *sprezzatura*) and in spite of all the distractions of imperial service, they leave the crowd of *eruditi* speechless. None was able to give a worthy explanation of any of the questions posed by Gerbert. The emperor judged their display of ignorance unworthy of his court,[52] and he ordered Gerbert to prepare a discourse on the various opinions of the Rational and the use of reason.[53]

The prefatory letter suggests that a great deal is at stake, nothing less than the standing of the imperial court. Gerbert writes his tract lest Italy should think the "sacred palace" sunk in torpor and Greece preen itself as the sole possessor of "imperial philosophy and Roman power." Rome and Byzantium are watching, it seems, as Gerbert is inspired and the others stumped.

This passage deserves a close analysis, but will I only point to the issues it raises. This is the only of Gerbert's writings where Aristotelian logic is central to a philosophical issue: the questions treated, he says, are "sophistic," and the resolution will be

[50] Cf. Pierre Riché, *Les Écoles et l'enseignement dans l'occident chrétien de la fin du Ve siècle au milieu du Xie siècle* (Paris 1979) 261: "[between the 8th and the 12th centuries] tous les maîtres font ... l'éloge de la dialectique ... mai ils l'enseignent rarement."

[51] PL 139.159A: "Cum in Germania ferventioris anni tempus demoraremur, imperialibus astricti obsequiis, ut semper sumus, semperque erimus, nescio quid arcana divina mensuram secum tacite retractans motus animi in verba resolvit, et quae ab Aristotele summisque viris erant difficillimis descripta sententiis, in medium protulit: ut mirum foret inter bellorum discrimina, quae contra Sarmatas parabantur, aliquem mortalium hos mentis recessus habere potuisse, a quibus tam subtilia, tam praeclara, velut quidam rivi a purissimo fonte proffluerent."

[52] PL 139.159B: "Vestra divina providentia ignorantiam sacro palatio indignam judicans ..."

[53] For a discussion, see F. Picavet, *Gerbert: Un pape philosophe d'après l'histoire et d'après la légende*, (Paris 1897) 150–158. Prantl's judgment of the tract: "eine höchst abenteuerliche Verquickung eines unverdauten Schulwissens"; *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande* (n. 17 above) 2.55.

provided by *spinosa dialectica.*[54] This is good confirmation that Gerbert considers some facility with the most difficult problems posed by Aristotle important in philosophy. It looms large in a defense of what Gerbert calls *imperialis philosophia*.

The other telling element of this frame narrative is the ignorance of the assembly. Not one of the *eruditi* could give a worthy explanation of the questions raised, though they were men "famous for their wisdom and distinguished for their eloquence" (*sapientia praeclari et eloquentia insignes*). We might be justified in inferring from that formulation that men schooled in a Ciceronian education (eloquence joined to wisdom) don't know their Aristotle. Gerbert states outright that their ignorance puts the reputation of the imperial court at risk (or rather he states that sentiment in the words of the emperor). Gerbert is its rescuer. The implied narrative then is, "Thank God that at least one man in the emperor's retinue knew his Aristotle." Of course, Gerbert wrote the narrative to please "sacred ears"[55] and, evidently, to commend his own talents to them. (The problems are the most difficult, they occur to him as if spontaneously, the distractions of looming war can't stop the flow, and the victory of the "inner chambers of the mind" over external cares is nearly miraculous). While he surely did not fabricate the whole report (the emperor had been a witness to the event described), he is reminding the young ruler what kind of a man he is and what kind of intellect he possesses. The display character of the preface and of the work itself is evident. We see Gerbert casting himself in the role of inspired genius in a world of more limited minds. But the importance for the cultivation of logic is, first, that it happens in isolation, hence can assert his credentials for virtuosity in a little understood discipline; Aristotle is useful because no one else understands him. Second, that Gerbert probably perceived the force of logic to frame arguments that make incontrovertible claims about reality and to approach truth.[56] Here he implies an understanding of dialectic as something much more important than the handmaiden of oratory and in doing so rises well outside of the limits within which his contemporaries operate. He also anticipates issues of the controversy over universals in the twelfth century.[57]What is to be said of its contribution to logic? It survives in two manuscripts, and no one to my knowledge quotes it.[58] Gerbert intended it as an exercise for the emperor, to be indulged in between his studies of mathematics: "Legetis haec inter vestrae matheseos exercitia."[59] His prelude to the work suggests his role as an innovator introducing a subject of which most high clerics are ignorant. If many in monasteries mastered the art, the

[54] PL 139.159D.

[55] PL 139.168D.

[56] This impulse in Gerbert is also indicated in his major scientific preoccupation: mathematics, geometry, astronomy. A couple of verses to Otto III accompanying a work on mathematics admire numbers as realities, above falsehood, invention and ambiguity: "Quocirca gravidi textum rimare libelli / Praesentique vigil vim ratione vide: / Nec locus hic mendis, nec lusum ficta subornant, / Verborumve fidem frivula conciliant, / Mensuram docet et numerum pondusque remotis / Ambiguis. Tantum mens oculata legat." Nicolaus Bubnov, *Gerberti Opera Mathematica* (Berlin 1899; repr. Hildesheim 1963) 149, included among *Dubia*.

[57] Picavet, *Gerbert* (n. 53 above) 158.

[58] On the manuscripts, see *Oeuvres de Gerbert, Pape sous le nom de Sylvestre* II, ed. A. Olleris (Clermont and Paris 1867) 297; Manitius, *Geschichte der lateinischen Literatur* (n. 17 above) 2. 737. By contrast, Gerbert's quadrivial works are abundantly transmitted. See Bubnov, *Gerberti Opera Mathematica* (n. 58 above) passim.

[59] PL 139.168D.

brilliance of his own genius would be dimmed and the imperial court further indicted for its ignorance.

The other important point is the context of this display of philosophy. It is the imperial court. The emperor is credited with high pride in the intellectual level of the court.[60] Gerbert posits something called "imperial philosophy" and positions himself as its defender. His impassioned speech (*Nostrum, nostrum est imperium Romanum!*) makes the emperor into an honorary philosopher joining dominion and learning in his own person: "Caesar is ours, o emperor and Augustus of the Romans, you who, born of the highest nobility of the Greeks, surpass the Greeks in dominion [*imperio*], who rule over the Romans by hereditary right, and who lead both in genius and eloquence."[61] At no point does he suggest that the learning on which the reputation of the court depends is monastic in origin or character. The emperor and the empire are the constant points of reference and the prime mover of learning and philosophy for Gerbert.[62]

At a glance the figure of Gerbert seems to confirm the consensus view of tenth century philosophy sketched above: his origins and early career were at the monastery of Aurillac, and he served briefly as abbot of the Benedictine monastery of Bobbio.[63] Richer's report makes clear that Gerbert's early association with the monastery of Aurillac, a religious house touched by the Cluniac reform movement, has no connection to his cultivation of Aristotelian logic, unless the monastery had played the role of whetting his appetite for the subject by its absence. What the young oblate Gerbert studied at Aurillac was grammar.[64] For further instruction in the arts he traveled to Spain. His introduction to logic came neither in Aurillac nor in Bobbio, but rather first in Rome at the emperor's court, then at the cathedral school of Reims. In 970 Gerbert travelled with his two patrons, Bishop Hatto of Vich and Duke Borell II of Barcelona,

[60] The same is true of Otto II as represented in Richer's report on the disputation at Ravenna between Gerbert and Ohtric of Magdeburg in late 980 or early 981 (*Historiae* Bk. 3, Chaps. 55–65). On disputations and displays of learning and their critical role at an imperial court, see my study "Gerbert versus Ohtric: Spielregeln einer akademischen Disputatio im 10. Jahrhundert," to appear in *Spielregeln, Konventionen und Gewohnheiten im Mittelalter*, Festschrift for Gerd Althoff.

[61] PL 139.159B–C: "Noster es Caesar, Romanorum imperator et Auguste, qui summo Graecorum sanguine ortus, Graecos imperio superas, Romanis haereditario jure imperas, utrosque ingenio et eloquio praevenis."

[62] Gerbert's poem in praise of Boethius ("Roma potens dum iura suo declarat in orbe") links the philosophy of Boethius directly with his imperial service and appoints him honorary scholar at the court of Otto III: "Nunc decus imperii, summas qui praegravat artes, / Tertius Otto sua dignum te iudicat aula." A poem attributed to Gerbert and attached in the PL edition (though in no manuscript) to *De rationali*, is studded with language associating learning with the court ("Quisquis opaca velis sophie scandere regna"). MGH Poetae 5.474–476.

[63] His abbacy began in late 982 or early 983. By late 983 he had fled the monastery. On Gerbert's rise and fall at Bobbio, see Pierre Riché, *Gerbert d'Aurillac: Le pape de l'an mil* (1987; Paris 2006) 63–74. The rich study of Gerbert as abbot by Michele Tosi, "Il governo abbaziale di Gerberto a Bobbio," *Gerberto* (n. 42 above) 71–234, is a treasure trove of material for the history of Bobbio in the 10th c., including a list of its extensive library holdings.

[64] Richer, chap. 43, ed. Hofmmann 191: "... in coenobio sancti confessoris Geroldi a puero altus, et grammatica edoctus est." On the role of Aurillac in Gerbert's development, see Edmond-René Labande, "La Formation de Gerbert à St. Geraud d'Aurillac," *Gerberto* (n. 42 above) 21–34, at 25: "Or il semble que Gerbert, s'il y a utilement assimilé cet art [i.e., Grammar], s'il a commencé à s'y former aux procédés de la rhétorique, ignorait encore tout de la dialectique lorsqu'il quitta Aurillac." Also Riché, "L'enseignement de Gerbert à Reims," *Gerberto* (n. 42 above) 51–69.

to Rome, possibly for the marriage of Otto II to Theophanu. Introduced to the pope (John XIII), Gerbert impressed him as a young man of high industry possessed of a powerful urge to learn. Italy at that time being impoverished in the areas of music and astronomy, as Richer claims, the pope commended Gerbert to Otto the Great, emperor since 962, as exceptionally learned in the quadrivium and "able to give his [that is, the emperor's] followers a rigorous education in those subjects."[65] Otto fastens possessively onto the young prodigy and closes all doors to his return to the pope, who then indicates to Bishop Hatto and Duke Borell in the most unassuming tone that the king wished, for the time being, to retain the young man in his service. These two worthies returned to Spain consoled by the false hope that their charge would soon return to them. When the emperor sounds out the young man on his learning, he finds that he is sufficiently learned in the quadrivium but that now in addition he wished to learn the science of logic.[66] It happened that an archdeacon of Reims, Gerannus, who enjoyed the highest reputation in the field of logic at the time, was in Rome as the legate of King Lothar to Otto I. The emperor consents to Gerbert's tutelage with Gerannus, and the two eventually head off for Reims together. From Gerannus Gerbert learned logic and soon was proficient in it.[67] Twelve or thirteen years passed between Otto's first visit to Rome, his stay in Reims with Gerannus, and his appointment as Abbot of Bobbio. Therefore we must exclude both Aurillac and Bobbio as originating sources for Gerbert's knowledge of logic, though the excellent library of Bobbio will have served him well during his stay there.

Richer's report makes clear also that it was the emperor who was primarily interested in attracting to his service a talented young man and granting him leave of absence to study logic. The pope was the mediator, not the instigator of Gerbert's pedagogic role; it was Otto the Great who had the largest stake in cultivating a promising young scholar. Far from indicating any kind of indifference of the king to quadrivial and logical studies, we might well infer from Richer's report that the emperor had so intense a concern for cultivating learning that he risked irritating both the pope and the two Spanish gentlemen.

Gerbert maintained close friendships with Abbot Gerald of Aurillac and with other monks of Aurillac and Bobbio, but also with many outside of the monastic life.[68] He defended the interests of the monasteries and churches he served vigorously and ultimately, as pope, of western Christendom. But apart from these ties, he has left few indications in his writings of intellectual obligations to the monastic world.[69] He de-

[65] Richer, chap. 44, ed. Hoffmann, 192: "... suos strenue docere valeret."

[66] Ibid. 192–193: "... de artibus interrogatus, in mathesi se satis posse, logice vero scientiam se addiscere velle respondit."

[67] Richer, bk. 3, chap. 45.

[68] On Gerbert and the ideal of friendship, see Courtney Demayo, "The Theory and Practice of Friendship in the Middle Ages: Ciceronian *amicitia* in the letters of Gerbert of Aurillac," *Viator* 38 no. 2 (2007) 319–338 .

[69] On Gerbert's monastic obligations, see Jean Leclercq, "Interpretazione gerbertiana della vita monastica," in *Gerberto* (n. 42 above) 677–689; and Michel Sot, "Le Moine Gerbert, l'église de Reims et l'église de Rome," *Gerbert l'européen: Actes du colloque d'Aurillac, 4–7 juin 1996,* ed. Nicole Charbonnel and Jean-Eric Iung (Aurillac 1997) 136–149. Both focus on Gerbert's defense of the rights of the church against lay intrusion. They can show his assimilation of the values of the monastic reform movement, and his use of the Rule of St. Benedict and of scripture in defending rights of the church, but neither can point to distinct

fined himself as a philosopher in the emperor's service.[70] A small but telling indication of his sense of self-definition as abbot of Bobbio comes in salutations of his letters during his abbacy. His letter collection begins in his time at Bobbio, and while such flourishes are rare in any of Gerbert's letters, six letters dating from Bobbio and the aftermath of his abbacy begin with salutations. They are Epist. 1: "Domino suo O[ttoni II] cesari semper augusto G[erbertus] quondam liber"; Epist. 4: "Divi cesaris G[erbertus] Bosoni in Christo salutem"; Epist. 6: "Domine sue Adalaidi semper auguste G[erbertus]"; Epist. 7: "G[erbertus] quondam scolasticus Ayrardo suo salutem"; Epist. 12: "Hugoni suo G[erbertus] quondam scolasticus"; Epist. 14: "Beatissimo pape Johanni G[erbertus] solo nomine officii Ebobiensis cenobii abbas." The second two express his sense of attachment to his secular lords: "Divine Caesar's Gerbert sends greetings in Christ to Boso"; "To his lady Adelheid always august, Gerbert." The letter to Boso (whose followers have stolen hay from Bobbio) is pure abbey business, where a formal identification as abbot might seem in order. But Gerbert puts his influence with "caesar" in the foreground and threatens Boso with the emperor's wrath, not God's. "Quondam scolasticus," "once upon a time a teacher," indicates a nostalgia for the life of study and the schools denied him because of the turmoil of the troubled monastery. The ambiguous, "quondam liber," of Epist. 1, must represent his abbacy as a captive state, his tenuous hold on power also indicated in the letter to the pope, "Abbot in name only." These salutations bespeak a self-identification contrary to that of the abbot dedicated to a spiritual mission. By contrast, Abbo of Fleury, neighbor but no friend of Gerbert, regularly precedes his letters with salutations like "A lover of the lovers of Christ, Abbo"; "Servant of the servants of God, Abbo"; "An unworthy servant of the servants of God, Abbo"; "The humble rector of the residents of Fleury, Abbo."[71]

Of course, Benedictine monasticism participated in the intellectual life of the period and Aristotelian logic aroused some interest, but the conviction of the historians of philosophy cited above that that discipline was central to philosophy as the period 950–1050 conceived and practiced it in the major centers of learning has little basis in the sources.

Abbo of Fleury is a contemporary of Gerbert also prominent for his learning, whose milieu and intellectual commitment are accurately characterized as monastic and Benedictine, in contrast to Gerbert's. He was a monk, schoolmaster, abbot, martyr and saint.[72] His biographer noted his learning in dialectic,[73] but his comments do not

monastic intellectual obligations outside of the polemics of administration. Leclercq (678) says that his study of *grammatica* would have opened the way to the *lectio divina*, but the absence writings on scripture by Gerbert and of any mention of scriptural studies in Richer of St. Remi's discussion of his teaching is also worth noting, the more striking since Carolingian studies of the language arts aimed programmatically at the study of scripture.

[70] As asserted, for instance,in the first sentence of *De rationali*: "... imperialibus astricti obsequiis, ut semper sumus, semperque erimus ..." (PL 139.159A).

[71] "amatorum Christi amator Abbo" (PL 139.423B); "famulorum Dei famulus Abbo" (424C); "indignus famulorum Christi famulus Abbo" (425B); "humilis Floriacensium rector Abbo" (429A).

[72] See the *Vita Abbonis* of Haimo of Fleury, PL 139.375–414.

[73] *Vita Abbonis*, chap. 3, PL 139,390B: "... grammaticae, arithmeticae, nec non dialecticae [artes] jam ad plenum indaginem attigerat ..."; 390C: "... quosdam dialecticorum nodos syllogismorum enucleatissime enodavit ..." (same passage chap. 7, 394A).

privilege dialectic. While Abbo did compose works on conclusions from syllogisms drawing on Boethius,[74] his dialectical studies shrink, in his biographer's presentation, to the importance of a passing reference. Prantl does not mention Abbo; Grabmann devotes three lines to him.[75] Kneale and Kneale devote part of a sentence to him with appropriately general framing: "Abbo of Fleury and Notker Labeo of St. Gall were other influential teachers of the period."[76]

I question that Abbo, Gerbert, or Notker deserve to be called "thinkers" in the discipline of dialectics. They sought, received and transmitted an education that prepared them broadly to speak and argue well.[77] Dialectic was potentially useful for argumentation; it was also perceived as a mental exercise and an art with the huge authority of Aristotle behind it, but the art itself was obscure and minor in comparison with grammar, understood as the arts of language (*litterae*), ranging from grammatical rules to the reading and composing of poetry.[78]

Likewise, it may be remarkable that Notker Labeo translated Boethius's Latin translation of *Peri Hermeneias* into German, but that work and other works on dialectics translated by Notker have no particular highlight in the large corpus of works he translated. And his accomplishment is after all one of translation, not original thought.

My purpose is not in any way to diminish any of the writers discussed, only to question their status as "thinkers" in the discipline of dialectic. Their contributions are elsewhere. Putting Abbo's and Gerbert's cultivation of dialectic in the foreground presents them at their weakest, hence ultimately diminishes them. I believe Pierre Riché has characterized Abbo's relation to dialectic well: "Comme Cicéron et Quintillien, il voit dans la dialectique un auxiliaire de l'art oratoire."[79] The same can be said of Gerbert and of educated men of the tenth-century generally.

The historians of philosophy quoted in the opening of this study would probably not disagree about the stature of dialectic in the period. Few who had studied the tenth century's level of interest in logic would or could disagree. The point here is the definition of philosophy. Privileging dialectic as the defining subject and Benedictine mo-

[74] *Syllogismorum categoricum et hypotheticorum enodatio,* ed. André Van de Vyver, *Abbonis Floriacensis opera inedita* (Bruges 1966). It is now available in a new critical edition with German translation: Abbo von Fleury, *De Syllogismis Hypotheticis, ed.* Franz Schupp, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 56 (Leiden 1996). Schupp argues Abbo's original insight in connecting Boethius's theory of hypothetical syllogisms with the list of such syllogisms known to the Middle Ages through Cicero's Topics. But it is also clear from Schupp's scholarship that Abbo's work had no influence, that the 12th c. took up hypothetical syllogisms without knowledge of Abbo, and the subject was forgotten by the 13th c. (VIff.). Remarkable as this insight may have been (Schupp IX: "In diesem Punkt ist die gesamte mittelalterliche Logik hinter der Leistung Abbos zurückgeblieben"), Abbo's logical writings are like a tree falling in the forest that no one heard.

[75] Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode* (1909; repr. Berlin 1956) 1.212.

[76] *Development of Logic* (n. 17 above) 199.

[77] Anita Guerreau-Jalabert, "Grammaire et culture profane à Fleury au xe siècle," *Positions des thèses* (Paris 1975), stresses the dual instruction of divine and secular letters at the monastery, and of the latter "l'apprentissage de la *grammatica* semble être la pierre angulaire" (95).

[78] Abbo's work titled *Quaestiones grammaticales,* composed for the monks of Ramsey Abbey, England, during his two-year stay there, is instructive. He deals with minutiae of pronunciation and prosody; PL 139.523A–534D. He quotes Virgil 14 times, Horace 8 times, and Aristotle once. Manitius's judgment, *Geschichte* (n. 17 above) 2.668: "Nirgends zeigt sich besonders tiefes Eingehen oder etwa besondere Gelehrsamkeit."

[79] Pierre Riché, *Abbon de Fleury: un moine savant et combatif (vers 950–1004)* (Turnhout 2004) 97.

nasticism as its transmitter skews the matter badly. Philosophy between Eriugena and Berengar or Anselm is not "pre-scholastic"; it bears hardly any relationship to scholasticism of any phase. It is not dialectical, or at least dialectics was a minor force. If the period is to be understood as insignificant in the history of philosophy, then let it be not because its representatives are mediocre logicians. If they knew little about logic, it was in large part because it did not matter much.

One other set of sources can give sharper focus on the age's conceptualizing of philosophy: the attacks of conservative clergy. Peter Damian's short tract titled *De sancta simplicitate scientiae inflanti anteponenda* is instructive. It is formulated as a letter to a monk named Ariprandus, who evidently has expressed a love of learning which he was never able to satisfy by the study of the liberal arts. Peter Damian assures him that a preference of liberal studies to sacred is foolishness: "Having a heart inclined to learning and a very quick mind, you demanded the gateway of the true light rather than the blind wisdom of the philosophers; you preferred to hasten to the desert, following in the footsteps of the fishermen, rather than sweating over liberal studies, or I should say, stulties."[80] His target throughout is grammar: *grammatica, litterae, litterarum studia.*[81] He praises St. Hilary for casting out the "Platonists and Pythagoreans," yet, even though unequipped with *philosophorum studia*, he nonetheless was able to command demons.[82] He gives some cautionary tales. A cleric named Ugo of Parma had innumerable "useful" gifts (implying, gifts that qualified him for office).[83] So ambitious was he, so bent on attaining a bishopric, that he became a chaplain of Emperor Conrad, but met a bad end before his ambitions were realized. The "study of the arts" (*artium studia*) are for Ugo of Parma the starting point of a career leading through imperial service to a bishopric—and for Peter Damian, the starting point of ambition leading to an untimely death.[84] Another cleric, born of the highest French nobility, whom he does not name in order not to (further) diminish the honor of a man still alive, lacked nothing to qualify him for office (*nescio an aliquid utilitatis desit [ei]*). Peter Damian gives an illuminating list of the things which make a man "useful":

> He possessed external goods in full flourishing, noble as an emperor, beautiful in every aspect of his appearance, he speaks like Tullius, writes poetry like Virgil, an eager advocate of the church, keen and acute in divine law. In scholastic dispute his words flow as if written in

[80] *De sancta simplicitate*, PL 145.695A: "... cum docile cor ac facillimum habeas ad discendum, ante veri luminis aditum requisisti quam caecam philosophorum sapientiam disceres; ante ad eremum pervolasti, sequens vestigia piscatorum, quam liberalium artium non dicam studiis sed stultitiis insudares."

[81] Cf. esp. chap. 3, arguing against eloquence as a preacher's virtue: possessing *copiam scientiae litteralis* is less valuable than living a Christian life (697A); following Christ promotes the faith better than *multiplicitas verborum* (697B); how little Christ needs *nostra grammatica* is evident in that he chose simple men and fishermen to disseminate the faith rather than *philosophos et oratores* (697B). Chap. 4: Blessed Benedict, sent *ad litterarum studia*, soon converts to the wise foolishness of Christ (699A); St. Martin cared nothing for *litterae*. Anthony was no rhetorician (*non rhetoricatur*, 699B). He praises Pope Leo (IX) as *sapienter indoctus*, and that means, no letters: "Litteras non didicerit, grammaticos quoslibet ac mundi philosophos ... praecellit" (701A).

[82] *De sancta simplicitate* 699B.

[83] *Utilitatum dotes* 700A. On *utilitas* in the sense of "qualification for office" see Jaeger, *Envy of Angels* (n. 15 above) 45, 60–61.

[84] *De sancta simplicitate*, chap. 6, 700A.

> a book. Speaking in the vernacular, he does not offend the urbanity of [classical?] Latin grammar [*Romanae urbanitatis regulam non offendit*].

In spite of all his gifts his life is such that all doors are closed to him.[85] The oratorical aspect of this man's gifts is evident. Even in that activity which comes closest to dialectic, "scholastic disputation," or "school debates," it is flowing speech, not ingenious argument or conceptual penetration that distinguishes him. The classical models of this highly learned gentleman are Cicero and Virgil. Aristotle is not mentioned.

While *De sancta simplicitate* leaves open the possibility that grammar and oratory are one thing and philosophy another, it is clear that those are the poles within which secular studies unfold. "Philosophy" also serves Peter Damian and others as a designation of the *studia artium* generally. Studies preparing the orator are inseparable in the mind of the author from worldly ambition aimed at high positions in church and secular administration.

Dialectics and Aristotle play a minor role or none in philosophy as Peter Damian conceived and attacked it,[86] even though it is apparent from his tract *De divina omnipotentia* that he himself had training in dialectics and was willing to use it in argument.[87] In a tract attacking liberal studies and worldly philosophy, only one passage unequivocally recognizes the existence of dialectic: John the Evangelist merits praise, says Peter Damian, because he despised "the cunning subtleties of the orators and the dialecticians" (*spretis oratorum dialecticorumque versutiis*).[88] The tract ends with another cautionary tale: the dream of Jerome, in which the high judge barred him from the gates of heaven and cast him down because "Ciceronianus es, non Christianus."[89]

The mainstream of "philosophy" in the period was Ciceronian, and it flowed through the imperial courts. In this configuring of philosophy, oratorical skill and the virtuous governance of life in the context of church or state service figure as the most prominent elements of "philosophy," and we can extend this to the thinking in cathedral schools in the eleventh century broadly. The ideal of conduct joined to the study of eloquence, as Gerbert, following Cicero, had formulated it, is both a way of life for

[85] *De sancta simplicitate,* chap. 6, 700C–D: "Hodie in Romana urbe frater advivit, ortus de summis proceribus Galliarum, cujus nomen taceo, quia fratris ignominiam perhorresco. Cui nescio an aliquid utilitatis desit. Tot siquidem exteriorum bonorum floribus enitescit: nobilis ut imperator, pulcher aspectu quodammodo, sicut Tullius loquitur, ut Virgilius poetatur; tuba vehemens in Ecclesia; perspicax et acutus est in lege divina; scholastice disputans, quasi descripta libri verba percurrit; vulgariter loquens, Romanae urbanitatis regulam non offendit."

[86] A survey of the polemics of Otloh of St. Emmeram would lead to the same conclusion. See for instance *De doctrina spirituali*, PL 146.263A–300A, esp. chap. 11, 270Aff. (*De libris gentilium vitandis et de studio sacrae lectionis*). An interesting passage is the following (279B): "Quid mihi tunc Socrates, vel Plato Aristotelesque, / Tullius ipse rhetor, mundanae dogmatis auctor?" Otloh evidently considered Cicero, not Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle, as the "author of worldly learning."

[87] See Toivo J. Holopainen, *Dialectic and Theology in the Eleventh Century*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters 54 (Leiden 1996) 6–43. Also Marenbon's discussion of Damian's tract in *Medieval Philosophy* (2007) (n. 8 above) 116–118.

[88] *De sancta simplicitate* 703A. This argument sheds some light on the issue that has long dominated the discussion of philosophy in the period, "dialecticians vs. anti-dialecticians." Holopainen (n. 87) surveys the controversy, esp. intro. and 157: "it can be doubted whether any eleventh-century thinker maintained a position that would come even close to the 'dialectical' view"; "there was no significant theoretical controversy between 'dialecticians' and 'anti-dialecticians' in the eleventh century." Peter Damian and Otloh were opposing secular philosophy, not dialectics.

[89] *De sancta simplicitate* 703B.

the public man and a program of studies. Philosophy makes the statesman, and the statesman is a kind of philosopher.[90]

This connection of philosophy and administrative skill continues strong in the eleventh century. A cleric at Worms wrote a letter to his bishop around 1030 commending him for translating Philosophy into acts of public administration: "The schoolmistress of all virtues (*magistra virtutum* = *Philosophia*) has taken up her abode in you, so that in all your undertakings you may follow in her footsteps."[91] The formulation evokes two models of Lady Philosophy: that of Cicero (*magistra virtutum*) and that of Boethius in *The Consolation of Philosophy*. In his complaint to Lady Philosophy, Boethius had reviewed their longstanding relationship and showed Philosophy guiding his investigations of the heavens and shaping his *mores* according to the pattern of celestial harmony; she taught him Plato's dictum that the happy state would be governed by students of wisdom, and brought him by that route to devote himself to the service of the state.[92]

The learning of the age is saturated with Ciceronian notions of philosophy. Many considered Cicero the most important philosopher; no one thought Aristotle was. *De officiis* and the *Tusculan Disputations* were the most popular sources. The letter collections from the period of Henry IV edited by Erdmann and Fickermann contain over 150 direct quotations of Cicero, 99 of them from the *Tusculan Disputations*. The interesting collection of letters from circles of imperial courtiers/clerics, the so called Regensburg Rhetorical Letters (ca. 1090), often appear as a cento of quotations from the *Tusculan Disputations*. The letters are epistolary philosophizing; they draw on dialectical argumentation, and offer one more, late, example of dialectic subordinated to rhetoric and to a conception of philosophy as "teacher of manners."[93] Meinhard of Bamberg, schoolmaster at Bamberg and later bishop of Würzburg, wrote to a former student some time in the 1060's or 70's commending the *Tusculan Disputations* as the most distinguished work of Latin philosophy, whose father is Cicero: "... hortor, ut Tusculanis tuis plurimus insideas, quibus Latina philosophia Cicerone parente nichil illustrius edidit."[94] While prudence warns against declaring a single passage paradigmatic, I think it justified in this case. Meinhard considers "the Tusculans" the most illustrious work of "Latin philosophy"; he regards Cicero as its father, and he commends it to a former student on his way to taking up administrative service at the cathedral of Cologne, possibly as its future bishop. There we have the constellation of

[90] The trope of the philosopher king and kingly philosopher is widespread in the period, esp. among the king's advocates and clerical advisors. E.g., Sigebert of Gembloux referring to the wise men serving Otto I: Bruno, Dietrich of Metz, and others of Bruno's students: *Vita Deoderici*, chap. 7, MGH SS 4.467, lines 38ff. And Benzo of Alba, *Ad Heinricum IV imperatorem libri VII*, ed. and trans. Hans Seyffert, MGH Script. Rer. Germ. In us. Schol. 65 (Hannover 1996) 108 (1.1): [the true path for the king is to "speak with Philosophy" once each day] "Quia tunc bene regitur res publica, quando imperant phylosophi et phylosophantur imperatores." Seyffert gives further references and bibliography, 109 n. 121.

[91] *Die ältere Wormser Briefsammlung*, ed. Walther Bulst, MGH Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit 3 (Weimar 1949) 89 (epist. 52).

[92] Boethius, *De consolatione philosophiae* 1, Prose 4, 15ff.

[93] In *Briefsammlungen der Zeit Heinrichs IV*. 274–368. For an analysis, see Jaeger, *Envy of Angels* (n. 15 above) 120–124.

[94] *Briefsammlungen der Zeit Heinrichs IV.*, ed. Carl Erdmann and Norbert Fickermann, MGH Briefe der deutschen Kaiserzeit 5 (Weimar 1950; repr. Munich 1981) 193 ("Weitere Briefe Meinhards," no. 1).

Ciceronian philosophy at work in the circles of imperial courtier bishops educated at a cathedral school, and philosophy conceived as a guide to the active life of a statesman/bishop. The sentiment is widely enough shared to venture suggesting that Meinhard's words should be regarded as definitive on a central conception of philosophy in the period.

Philosophy was a broad concept in the period ca. 950–1050. The word could designate the liberal arts generally, though it often narrowed to mean the quadrivium.[95] But it frequently referred also to the language arts understood as a preparation for oratory in the active life of administration. A *philosophus* could be a teacher of the arts, an advisor to a secular ruler or to an ecclesiastical administrator.[96] *Philosophia* could describe the monastic life, the connection that Jean Leclercq has explored deeply. But used in that context the term is always antithetical to that which it primarily designates: secular philosophy.

Ciceronian ideas brought with them a conception of philosophy coming to fulfillment in state service, in the active life. Gerbert's confession ("I've always been a follower of Cicero in private and public") manifests a real social and intellectual value. But while the extent to which it was a practiced value is a subject for other studies, the least we can say is that Ciceronian ideals were unquestionably educational ideals to which young men at cathedral schools were trained, and that suggests that they at least provided a scenario inculcated and cultivated in future clerical administrators.[97]

Ciceronianism was the mainstream. The two other detectable strains of philosophy were Platonic and Aristotelian. Given the predominant role of Cicero it would be a skewed weighing of evidence that argued, "the claim that Cicero is the father of philosophy was a badge, a shallow honorific, not indicative of a deeper cultural indebtedness infusing the institutions of education and rule, whereas Aristotle is the true philosopher" (as he was for the thirteenth century and beyond).

The scant acquaintance with Aristotle and the peripheral use of the *logica vetus* commends the question, how Aristotelian logic coupled to Benedictine monasticism got into the picture so prominently, especially when earlier scholars, among them historians of logic and scholastic method, question the significance, at least of logic, and argue the priority of a "literary culture."[98] Neither Jean Leclercq's study of the word

[95] Hrotsvitha's drama "Paphnutius" is a showpiece of quadrivial learning, where "philosophy" is the designation of the quadrivium.

[96] Other areas of reference are cited in Curtius, "Geschichte des Wortes Philosophia" (n. 31 above).

[97] Cicero's contribution to the intellectual world of the Middle Ages is an under-studied subject. Cicero "trismegistus" counted as the preeminent authority in three areas: philosophy, eloquence, and love and friendship. On the last, see Jan Ziolkowski, "Twelfth-century Understandings and Adaptations of Ancient Friendship," *Medieval Antiquity*, ed. Andries Welkenhuysen, Herman Braet, and Werner Verbeke, Mediaevalia Lovaniensia Series 1, Studia 24 (Louvain 1995) 59–81; C. Stephen Jaeger, *Ennobling Love: In Search of a Lost Sensibility* (Philadelphia 1999); Constant Mews, "Cicero and the Boundaries of Friendship in the Twelfth Century," *Viator* 38 no. 2 (2007) 369–384. The literature on Cicero's influence on rhetoric is extensive. In addition to many works by John O. Ward, see the collection of essays *The Rhetoric of Cicero in its Medieval and Early Renaissance Commentary Tradition*, ed. Virginia Cox and John O. Ward (Leiden 2006). Marcia Colish's *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages*, 2 vols. (Leiden 1985), includes a lengthy chapter on Cicero (1.61–158) ending at the 6th c.

[98] See David Knowles, *The Evolution of Medieval Thought*, 2nd ed., D. E. Luscombe and C. N. L. Brooke (London 1988) 75; and Hans Liebeschütz, "Western Christian Thought from Boethius to Anselm," *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Christian Philosophy*, ed. A. H. Armstrong (Cambridge

philosophia (n. 29 above) nor of the "love of learning" in Benedictine monasteries turns up any interest in dialectic, Aristotle, or speculative logic that could compete with the interest in classical literature in the Benedictine houses of the tenth and early eleventh centuries. Leclercq ends a long chapter on "Liberal Studies" with the comment, "This culture…remains profoundly impregnated by literature. It is more literary than speculative. This characteristic differentiates monastic humanism from … scholastic humanism."[99] The prominent role assigned to Benedictine monasticism by historians of philosophy is all the more curious, since it occasionally comes with comments downplaying the role of the imperial and royal courts, the major social context of late tenth and early eleventh century philosophy.

The history of philosophy in the period looks different when viewed from the cathedral schools in their relation to royal, imperial and ecclesiastical courts. Marenbon/McKitteridge point to eight new cathedral schools that arose in the later tenth century. That number could easily be doubled. They arose primarily because the new or renewed institution served imperial purposes.[100] The quantitative disproportion between these burgeoning institutions and the cultivation of Aristotelian dialectics in monastic communities is evident. Three figures from Benedictine monasticism are made to represent philosophy, 950–1050: Gerbert, Abbo and Notker, and the appropriation of Gerbert for the monastic realm is questionable.

The essay by David Luscombe on "Thought and Learning" in the recent *New Cambridge Medieval History* is a good start at recognizing the centrality of cathedral schools. It treats the period circumscribed by the scope of the volume, 1024–1198, but ranges necessarily beyond those boundaries on either end. Luscombe claims that the principal centers of learning in the eleventh century were "episcopal or cathedral schools." He touches on the culture of these schools, the nature and purpose of instruction there, the relevance of this learning to careers in the church and secular courts. He summarizes the character of cathedral school learning: "Personal discipline—grooming and elegance—as well as the arts and religion were taught; character was formed as well as the mind. Ruotger wrote in his *Life* of Bruno, brother of the emperor Otto I, archbishop of Cologne from 953 … that Bruno had regarded an education in the liberal arts as a vital qualification for rulership of the church and of the kingdom. Goodness and eloquence were needed. This ideal survived into the eleventh century and beyond."[101] I would add to Luscombe's observation the importance of classical learning based on various works of Cicero and classical Latin poets, and surprisingly, the composition of Latin poetry, manneristic and obscure in style, its sub-

1967) 587–610. This balanced and gratifyingly specific essay offers a pattern for writing the history of philosophy in the period. Liebeschütz is essentially pursuing the tradition of Boethius, whom he sees as first and foremost a Ciceronian and a "statesman as theologian"; philosophy is "man's guide." Boethius's interest in dialectic, according to Liebeschütz, was instrumental, not the goal of studies. He places Gerbert in the poles of Reims and the imperial court, and gives a detailed treatment of the debate at Ravenna with Ohtric and a close reading of Gerbert's tract *De rationali et ratione uti*. He does not mention monastic influences. He skips from Gerbert to Berengar of Tours, but gives useful readings of Anselm of Besate's "Rhetorimachia" and Manegold of Lautenbach's tract against Wolfhelm of Brauweiler.

[99] Leclercq, *The Love of Learning* (n. 31 above) 142.

[100] See Fleckenstein, "Königshof und Bischofsschule" (n. 23 above).

[101] *The New Cambridge Medieval History IV: c. 1024–c. 1198 Part I*, ed. David Luscombe and Jonathan Riley-Smith (Cambridge 2004) 463.

stance cluttered with learning, which, various sources claim, is the highpoint of education.[102]

It is obvious that institutions as distant and diverse as the cathedral schools at Reims, Liège, Cologne, Magdeburg, Worms, Würzburg, Regensburg, and Salzburg will also show intellectual diversity and, in the period in question, the effects of the religious reform movement in varying degrees. The Reims community since Gerbert showed considerable influence of the Cluniac reform, while still offering centrally an education based on the liberal arts, stressing oratorical training. The boundaries between the monastic world and that of secular clergy were porous. Conflict between the two spheres is a guide to the limits of their openness.[103]

A direction of philosophy that combined ideals of the ancient orator with the ethics of late Stoicism as transmitted by Cicero would seem to deserve a place in history of philosophy, 950–1050. It may be that the inclusion of this trend would do little to change the sense that it is a minor period in the history of philosophy, but taking sources like Ruotger, Walther of Speyer, Gerbert, and Meinhard of Bamberg, the letters, biographies and poems from cathedral communities, into consideration would have the advantage of crystallizing a concept of philosophy as the period in question understood, cultivated, and possibly even practiced it.

Also, greater skepticism of library catalogues, surviving manuscripts and book patronage as sources for intellectual interests and educational practice would help focus on what was central in the period. Library holdings are important sources of intellectual tradition, of course, but they can signal something very different than focal points of intellectual interest in a given period, and small libraries do not necessarily signal lack of learning, any more than large ones indicate learning that is broad and deep. Extensive holdings of Carolingian writings do not by themselves indicate continuing influence of Carolingian thought and cultural institutions. Books had to some extent a representative and not merely a practical function in the Ottonian period (and the more splendid, the more representative). Given that fact, less may have been more.[104] The perspective provided by the available texts and the library holdings has helped favor close scrutiny of the mouse of logic while the elephant of oratory and lived philosophy hulks unobserved in the same room.

McKitterick and Marenbon recognize clearly that bishops are the main bearers of culture in the period. It is worth considering that bishops themselves are to the Ottonian/Salian era what books were to the Carolingian, the works of art of the period, its philosophy embodied, many of them products of imperial patronage.

I also hope that the idea of intellectual continuity from Carolingian to Ottonian/Salian period and from the eleventh century to the twelfth will be revisited. The

[102] See Jaeger, "The Status of the Learned Poet in the Eleventh Century," *Norm und Krise von Kommunikation: Inszenierungen literarischer und sozialer Interaktion im Mittelalter* (Tübingen 2007) 417–438.

[103] The tribulations of Wazo of Liège illuminate claims of secular/imperial clergy asserted against monastic. See *Envy of Angels* (n. 15 above) 202ff.

[104] Mayr-Harting cites the manuscript collections of canon law available in the 10th-c. Cologne library and contrasts that collection with the silence of other sources on the study and practice of law. He formulates a useful distinction between the book as an "icon [that] symbolizes the archbishop as a fountain source of canon law" and "a book for actual study." *Church and Cosmos* (n. 22 above) 139.

Carolingian age prepared for Ottonian culture in many ways, above all by creating a high level of Latin literacy. But the philosophy and scriptural studies of the earlier period faded. Beryl Smalley recognized the period 950–1050 as a low point in the study of the Bible in the Middle Ages. Was there really any continuity joining the logic of the ninth century to that of the tenth? Or that of the tenth/early eleventh to that of the twelfth? The non-reception of the logic of Gerbert and Abbo suggests that continuity in logic happened in the thinnest of trickles. The major response to dialectic, once it asserted itself seriously in Berengar, second half of the eleventh century, was strong resistance both in monastic and episcopal centers. If the dialectical studies in Benedictine monasteries had prepared for the logic of the late eleventh century, could the resistance to Berengar possibly have polarized the intellectual world as severely as it did?

The stress placed by historians of philosophy on Aristotelian logic is understandable within shared notions of the modern discipline of philosophy, first, that thought becomes philosophical when it becomes speculative, second that the history of philosophy is the history of written philosophical texts. Those presuppositions enable a perspective that writes the history of philosophy, 950–1050, from Carolingian sources forward and from early scholasticism backwards. I think it is that tendency above all that has directed the historians of philosophy to a subject of minor importance in the philosophy of the period in between and distracted them from what that period took to be philosophy. A trend which produced no philosophical writings and had its expression in contemporary administrative, diplomatic and legal practice, in the scantly recorded education of the cathedral and monastic schools, and in the lives and letters of the philosophers who embodied and lived it, has not yet asserted itself in histories of medieval philosophy.[105]

[105] Philosophy as a way of living (rather than strictly a way of thinking and writing) is well known in the ancient world and has a prominent modern commentator in Pierre Hadot; see his *What is Ancient Philosophy?* trans. Michael Chase (1995; Cambridge MA and London 2004). John Marenbon notes a variant of this conception in *Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction* (n. 8 above) 7.